tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-43671902338777996322024-03-17T20:01:38.343-07:00On MemeticsMemes and the Science of Cultural EvolutionTim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.comBlogger1323125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-41394811486404331392024-02-20T13:03:00.000-08:002024-02-20T15:38:48.279-08:00Dan Dennett: From Genes To Memes:The Evolution of Language and AI<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/DFQhTOpHxNA?si=tyE3Ekb546ZgdF3q" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen></iframe><P>
One notable part is around 25 minutes in. Dennett complains about intelligent machines creating counterfeit people - and then proposes making counterfeit people illegal. No more Batman. No more Spiderman. No more Superman. It seems like an absurd proposal to me. What can Dennett be thinking about?<P><br><br>Memes start around 45 minutes in.<P>Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-61782882666230284762023-11-27T07:58:00.000-08:002023-11-27T07:58:45.078-08:00Ryan Chapman - Why Do We Believe Things That Aren't True?<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Cy4Z7DTd9uo?si=_4CeeZpV8l2cpHJX" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen></iframe>Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-26301626260762578842023-11-26T09:36:00.000-08:002023-12-09T05:22:27.696-08:00What evolves in Universal Darwinism?Back in 2012, I wrote the article: <a href="https://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2012/07/an-inherited-unit-for-universal.html">An inherited unit for Universal Darwinism</a> - in which I proposed that we reuse the term "gene" for this purpose. "Gene" is a bit of an overloaded term, but it could still be useful in this application, I claimed.<P>
I still think we ought to be able to reuse the term "gene" - assuming that we define it in a sufficiently general way in the first place. So: if we say that a gene is a small peice of inherited information, I think we can use that definition in Universal Darwinism. Note that this is an information-theoretic definition that makes no reference to the world of atoms.<P>
I mentioned some other candidate terminology in that 2012 post. Have others attempted to address this question in the interim?<P>
Another candidate is "innovation". For example see <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsif.2013.1190">this 2014 paper</a> titled: "
Spaces of the possible: universal Darwinism and the wall between technological and biological innovation".
While the term "gene" comes from evolutionary biology, innovation comes from the stuudy of technological evolution. "Innovation" has the implication of novelty and newness. However, "innovation" strikes me as a broadly similar term.<P>
Another attempt was made recently by Lee Cronin. He wrote this - about what counts as an "object" in <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06600-9">his own reworking of evolutionary theory</a>:<P>
"An object is finite, is distinguishable, persists over time and is breakable such that the set of constraints to construct it from elementary building blocks is quantifiable."<P>
I think that's a bit of a hot mess. It seems to say that things have to be "breakable" to evolve. I don't see the need to refer to infinite objects or unquantifiable sets either. However, perhaps we should take the term "object" seriously as a candidate term for "things that evolve". Another similar candidate is "entity".<P>
None of these more recent proposals have much to do with evolutionary biology - but some may have their merits.<P>
Update: Bing offers this: "The generalization made in Universal Darwinism is to replace “organism” with any recognizable pattern, phenomenon, or system." No catchy terminology - but it does at least try to capture some of the breadth of the generalization intended.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-11382935938251914412023-04-17T16:59:00.005-07:002023-10-03T20:05:40.053-07:00Chatbots on cultural kin selectionI tried explaining cultural kin selection to ChatGPT. It doesn't really get it: it keeps talking about "genetic relatives". It does illustrate what I'm up against though, IMO. Transcript follows:<br>
<p color="#FF7070"><STRONG>TT: What is cultural kin selection?</STRONG></P>
Cultural kin selection is a theory that explains how humans develop and transmit cultural traits or behaviors that promote the survival and reproduction of their genetic relatives. This theory suggests that individuals may be more likely to adopt and transmit cultural practices that benefit their genetic relatives, such as their siblings, parents, and children, because these behaviors increase the probability that their genetic material will be passed on to the next generation.<P>
The concept of kin selection was originally developed in evolutionary biology to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviors in animals, such as when animals sacrifice their own reproductive success to help their close relatives. Cultural kin selection applies the same principle to cultural transmission, suggesting that individuals may be more likely to adopt and transmit cultural traits that benefit their genetic relatives, even if those behaviors do not directly benefit the individual themselves.<P>
For example, a cultural practice of sharing resources with extended family members may have evolved because it promotes the survival and reproduction of genetic relatives, even if it means sacrificing resources for oneself. Similarly, cultural practices that promote cooperation and social cohesion within kin groups may have evolved because they increase the survival and reproductive success of genetic relatives. Cultural kin selection, therefore, provides a framework for understanding how cultural traits evolve and spread through populations based on their impact on genetic relatedness.<P>
<p color="#FF7070"><STRONG>TT: Cultural kin selection is actually a theory about how kin selection applies to cultural evolution. It's about shared memes, not shared genes. It suggests that cultural traits may spread via influencing copies of themselves in other bodies. So, for example, memes for suicide bombing could still spread despite the fact that they reduce the fitness of their host - if the resulting attack is successful and inspires others. Did you learn anything about that?</STRONG></P>
You are correct. I apologize for my earlier response. Cultural kin selection is a theory about how kin selection applies to cultural evolution, specifically in the transmission of cultural traits or memes. It suggests that individuals may be more likely to adopt and transmit cultural practices that benefit their kin, even if those practices do not directly benefit the individual themselves.<P>
As you mentioned, this theory suggests that cultural traits or memes may spread through populations by influencing copies of themselves in other bodies. Memes can be transmitted through social learning, such as through imitation, teaching, or storytelling. Just like genes, memes can also replicate and mutate, and those that are more successful at spreading will be more likely to persist and evolve over time.<P>
While cultural kin selection suggests that cultural traits that benefit kin may be more likely to spread, it is important to note that not all cultural traits or memes will necessarily promote the survival or reproduction of genetic relatives. Some cultural practices may even be harmful to the individuals who adopt them or to their kin. Therefore, the spread of cultural traits is a complex phenomenon that is influenced by a variety of factors, including social learning, cultural transmission biases, and the fitness consequences of the traits themselves.<P>
I also tried Bing chat. It has the same conceptual issue:<br>
<p color="#FF7070"><STRONG>TT: What is cultural kin selection?</STRONG></P>
Cultural kin selection is a theory that explains how cultural traits can evolve through natural selection in a way that benefits an individual’s relatives. It is based on the idea of kin selection, which is an evolutionary strategy that favors the reproductive success of an organism’s relatives. Kin altruism can look like altruistic behavior whose evolution is driven by kin selection.<P>
I hope this helps! Let me know if you have any other questions.<P>
Lastly I tried Google Bard. It mostly gets it!<P>
<p color="#FF7070"><STRONG>TT: What is cultural kin selection?</STRONG></P>
Cultural kin selection is a theory that explains how cultural traits can be passed down through generations, even if they do not confer a direct genetic benefit to the individual. The theory argues that individuals who share a common culture are more likely to help each other, even if they are not related genetically. This is because they share a common set of values and beliefs, which makes them more likely to trust and cooperate with each other.<P>
There is some evidence to support the theory of cultural kin selection. For example, studies have shown that people are more likely to help others who share their language, religion, or ethnicity. This suggests that people are more likely to feel a sense of kinship with those who share their cultural background.<P>
Cultural kin selection can have a significant impact on human societies. For example, it can help to explain why people are willing to sacrifice their own resources to help others in their community. It can also help to explain why people are willing to follow the rules and norms of their society, even if they do not always benefit them personally.<P>
The theory of cultural kin selection is still under development, but it is a promising new way of understanding how culture evolves.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-40906731058978036712023-01-20T18:32:00.008-08:002023-01-21T05:48:36.636-08:00CosmismI've written here before aobut <a href="https://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/03/alien-memtic-takeover.html">the 'A for Andromeda' scenario</a> ...in which organisms spread through the universe via radio waves - relying on the prior existence of organisms smart enough to construct radio receivers in remote locations<P>
This is in contrast to the more usual scenario - where life spreads via interactions between atoms and matter. If there are enough radio receivers around, spreading via information may be possible. The advantage of spreading via information is that you can spread faster - perhaps at a significant fraction of the speed of light.<P>
Spreading between the stars via information seems reminiscent of a cosmic religion. I propose that we call it "Cosmism".<P>
The viability of cosmism is likely to depend on the age of the universe. In the early universe there will not be enough radio receivers around to make Cosmism viable. However, as the universe ages, more and more radio receivers will appear - making Cosmism more viable.<heP>
It has been speculated that Cosmism faces a "window" - with smart enough agents developing immunity to Cosmism's message. I think this may under-estimate the attractiveness of Cosmism to the recipients. If there's a window it could be very wide.<P>
If Cosmism is indeed viable, there may be a competitive dynamic between factions that want to spread via atoms and factions that want to spread via radio waves. It could be a significant power struggle. Cosmism may stand accused of giving technolgy to future competitors for resources.<P>
Such resource conflicts are common in nature. A strawberry plant typically faces a choice between growing more leaves, reproducing via runners or reproducing via seed. A seed
is not pure information - but it is quite close. This is analogous to: staying on the home planet, propagating to other planets via matter (genes) or propagating to other planets via information (memes).<p>
The spread of Cosmism could also be likened to a pioneer species. Those also travel fast and can survive in inhospitable conditions. Once an ecosystem is mature the pioneer species vanish - but they played their part in initially transforming the ecosystem.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-54185025960074642382023-01-07T10:10:00.003-08:002023-01-07T10:10:42.163-08:00RIP Herb GintisAlas, Herb Gintis is no longer with us. He was a pioneer of social and cultural evolution.<P>
There is a page on this site devoted to related media resources <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2011/06/herbert-gintis.html">here</a>.<P>
Also, here is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Gintis">his Wikipedia page</a>.<P>
Lastly, here is my review of <a href="https://smile.amazon.com/review/RRZBM9U4T09KY/">A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution</a><P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-75619198947777808562022-11-26T07:43:00.003-08:002022-11-26T07:45:36.792-08:00Computronium and hedoniumComputronium is sometimes defined as an arrangement of matter that is the best possible form of computing device for that amount of matter.<P>
Many futurists have become enamoured of the idea that a future cyberspace will consist of computronium.<P>
<iframe width="800" height="500" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lAJkDrBCA6k" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe><P>
The idea that far future creatures will turn matter into computronium seems to be largely based on projecting out the trend towards larger brains. However, there is another relevant aspect - we know from scaling laws is that larger greatures have relatively smaller nervous systems, and relatively larger muscular, skeletal and digestive systems. The organism with the highest brain to body ratio is an ant.<P>
Some hedonists have a similar concept: "hedonium". That represents the arrangement that represents the highest state of pleasure for a given amount of matter.<P>
After giving appropriate weight to the metabolic scaling aspect, I think that "computronium" or "hedonium" are probably not much like what most matter will turn into in the future. The idea ignores biological optimization targets. The purpose of most living things is not to compute or to represent pleasure - but rather to survive and reproduce. It is a different optimization target. Structural, digestive and metabolic elements are especially true if resources are limited and there is competition for them. That is the state which most living ecosystems gravitate towards. It results in more of a zero-sum environment, where to obtain resources to have to deprive another agent of them.<P>
I think that futurists have been fetishizing intelligence and computation. As an example, consider Moravec's "<a href="https://frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/project.archive/general.articles/1992/CyberPigs.html">Pigs in cyberspace</a>" article. Planty of references to computation, but muscles and metabolism are sidelined. Bodies themselves are considered expendable and ephemeral. To me, it seems like a weird and twisted perspective which poorly reflects what we know about living systems. It's not that there won't be a cyberspace, but rather than it is likely to be be the tip of an iceberg consisting of other metabolic processes.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-15769791399357818572022-11-26T05:41:00.001-08:002022-11-26T05:41:17.196-08:00Meme warfare dynamicsMeme warfare is mediated by small, fast-moving particles - photons and electrons. Gene warfare is slower and typically involves more protons and neutrons. Memes are able to spread over considerable distances at near light speed, and can penetrate further and faster, but the dynamics are are a bit different from gene warfare. Recipients can choose to put their fingers in their ears and ignore the alien propaganda - if they so choose. So: it needs to be palatable fare - laced with gifts and treasures. However if the meme invasion is to be followed by a "gene" invasion involving real matter, it should not provide the enemy with too much useful technology. This is likely a common situation.<P>
There have been a few SF stories about meme invasions leading directly to gene invasions without the use of spaceships or other classical invasion tools. Fred Hoyle's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_for_Andromeda">A for Andromeda</a> is a classic example. It is an interesting possibility. There might be a window of opportunity between a civilization being born and its memetic immune system maturing - during which it could be more vulnerable to such attacks. Maybe technological gifts can be interwoven with alien propaganda in a manner that enticies the recipient to digest the message - even if it contains elements that conflict with their developmental process. I wrote about this possibility here before - back in <a href="https://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/03/alien-memtic-takeover.html">2013</a>.<P>
Another consideration here is how the economics of long-distance meme warfare work. Organisms typically face a tradeoff between local growth and development and large-scale distribution of pollen or seeds. When it comes to civilization using its local resources to send out messages through interstellar space a complex cost-benefit analysis is involved to see whether it is likely to pay off. It seems likely to be advantageous to identity living systems and then broadcast to them directly using lasers. Perhaps this is part of the reason why some stars seem to twinkle.<P>
Refs:<br>
<UL>
<LI><a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/06/meme-warfare.html">Meme-warfare</a> (2013)
<LI><a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2011/08/memetic-warfare.html">Memetic-warfare</a> (2011)
<LI><a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2010/10/meme-warfare-centre.html">Meme warfare centre</a> (2010)
<LI><a href="https://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/03/alien-memtic-takeover.html">Alien memetic takeover</a> (2013)
<LI><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_for_Andromeda">A for Andromeda</a>
</UL>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-36399576727963566392022-10-30T06:00:00.004-07:002022-10-30T06:00:58.432-07:00Andrej Karpathy on memeticsIt is nice to see that some of the thought leaders of the day embracing memetics:<P>
Lex: What do you think about the idea that ideas are the organisms. The memes?<BR>
Andrej: Yes, love it. 100%. <Laughs><BR>
Lex: Are you able to walk around with that notion for a while that there's an evolutionary kind-of-process with ideas as well?<BR>
Andrej: There absolutely is. There's memes just like genes, and they compete and they live in our brains. It's beautiful.<BR>
Lex: Are we silly humans thinking that we're the organsisms? Is it possible that the primary orgaisms are the ideas?<P>
This is from the "Book recommendation" section of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdiD-9MMpb0">this video</a>.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-6578663776262963862022-09-13T20:41:00.003-07:002022-09-13T20:43:55.285-07:00Peak memeI already have an article titled "<a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2012/03/peak-meme.html">Peak meme?</a>" - from 2012. However, this time there's no question mark. Here are the stats:<P>
<img src="http://timtyler.org/on_memetics/peak-meme.png"><P>
Of course, this article could also prove to be premature. However at the moment it certainly looks as though <i>peak meme</i> was somewhere around January 2020. Around the start of the global pandemic, IOW.<P>
Incidentally, August 2011 is when my book on memes and memetics was published. It was an interesting time for the field.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-76526281768012655982022-05-21T20:13:00.004-07:002024-03-10T07:21:48.913-07:00What counts as a population in general theories of evolution?I stumbled across a paper today (by Karim Baraghith) on a topic near to my heart. It addresses the question of: what counts as a population in forms of "generalized Darwinism".<P>
It gives what seems to me to be a very complicated answer. It says that a population should be defined using the: “causal interactionist population concept” (CIPC) - a concept it attributes to Roberta Millstein (2010).<P>
Here is the paper under discussion: <a href="https://www.academia.edu/39977777/Investigating_Populations_in_Generalized_Darwinism">https://www.academia.edu/39977777/Investigating_Populations_in_Generalized_Darwinism</a><P>
It introduces the causal interactionist population concept (CIPC) as follows:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>According to Roberta Millstein’s CIPC (Millstein 2010, p. 67) emphasis added):<BR>
(a) Populations […] consist of at least two conspecific organisms that, over the course of a generation, are actually engaged in survival or reproductive
inter-actions, or both.<BR>
(b) The boundaries of the population are the largest grouping for which the rates of interaction are much higher within the grouping than outside.<BR>
</BLOCKQUOTE>
I think this paper is over-thinking things. I am strongly opposed to defining a population in terms that prohibit populations with one member. We do not need one theory for
populations of size greater than two and another for populations of size less than two. That would be ridiculous! Evolutionary theory can and should deal with populations of any size. There is no rule that says their size must be two or greater. If there is only one remaining organism in a diminishing lineage, evolutionary theory should still apply. Nor is it the case that such populations do not evolve - or can only evolve to extinction. They can evolve via self-directed evolution, for example and they can also grow into larger populations. Size less than two is a basic requirement and <b>must</b> be supported! I think that we can put evolutionary theories that fail to meet this basic test into the trash basket.<P>
Nor is it appropriate to reference concepts such as "organism", "generation", "survival" or "reproduction" in a definition of what counts as a population. In general theories of evolution, the simplest population concept is a set - a mathematical set.<P> There's no need for anything more complex than this. Or so I claim. In my support, I cite Occam's razor. If your theory or your concept is too complex, ditch it. This is a good case in point.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-55492072999634888532021-10-29T22:03:00.001-07:002021-10-29T22:03:12.678-07:00The Knowing Universe by John Campbell<IMG src="https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1634640863l/59410493.jpg" align=right>John Campbell's <a href="https://smile.amazon.com/gp/product/B09JJFF771/">The Knowing Universe</a> is out now.<P>
Readers may be familiar with John Campbell because of his previous works, particularly:<P>
<UL>
<LI><a href="https://smile.amazon.com/Universal-Darwinism-knowledge-John-Campbell/dp/1456456938/">Universal Darwinism</a>
<LI><a href="https://smile.amazon.com/Darwin-Does-Physics-John-Campbell/dp/1503199436/">Darwin does Physics</a>
</UL>
Judging by the blurb, the work of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_J._Friston">Karl Friston</a> is prominently on the menu.<P>
Anyway, I didn't read this book yet, but subscribers may find it of interest.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-22764632519114004222021-10-22T20:50:00.007-07:002024-01-13T05:36:59.428-08:00The technical as a kingdom of lifeBiologists categorize life into kingdoms. Animal, vegetable, fungal - and so on. Memetics proposes that culture is alive too. "Memes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically". Where does culture fit into biology's grand classification schemes? As far as I can tell, it doesn't. I've looked at numerous resources about classifying living things into large-scale categories or "kingdoms" - and none makes any mention of culture.<P>
A pioneer of promoting classification of culture as its own kingdom has been Kevin Kelly. In "The Technium" and "What Technology Wants" Kevin argues that "technical stuff" merits classification as a new kingdom of life. <a href="https://www.edge.org/conversation/kevin_kelly-the-technium-and-the-7th-kingdom-of-life">Here</a> is Kevin in 2007:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>One way to think of the technium is as the 7th kingdom of life. There are roughly six kingdoms of life according to Lynn Margulis and others. As an extropic system that originated from animals, one of the six kingdoms, we can think of the technium as a 7th.</BLOCKQUOTE><P>
Technology seems a bit narrower than culture, but it covers many cultural phenotypes, so sure: the technical should be up there with the animal and the vegetable as a large scale kingoms of life. Go Kevin!<P>
While Kevin has basically the right idea, I am more worried about the rest of the world's biologists. How come they are promoting such messed up classification schemes? How can they think culture is not alive? Rocks are not alive, but culture is <em>clearly</em> alive. It reproduces. It exhibits adaptation. Anyone who thinks that culture is not alive has a pretty messed up conception of what life is. Biology is the study of life - by definition. How can that <em>not</em> include culture?<P>
I don't know exactly what has happened, here, but it is obviously pretty messed up. Biologists should be embarassed and ashamed of their crappy classifcation schemes. What were they thinking? How come they have made such an enormous screw up? I don't have all the answers, but I suspect that "the social sciences" might have something to do with it. <EM>Apparently</EM>, anything to do with humans comes under the remit of the social sciences - and they have got stuck in a murky backwater for decades, with many of the practitioners not accepting the scientific method, not accepting evolution, not accepting cultural evolution, or promoting various other sorts of archaic nonsense. Even so, it takes two to tango. If the social sciences want to monopolize the science of human behavior, other biologists don't have to let them. Biologists should stand up and fight for culture to also be within their remit.<P>
Look at a car - for example. Is it an animal? No. Is it vegetable? No. Is it mineral? No. It is something else. That many biologists can't sensibly classify such a common object into their kingdoms of life reflects badly on them. They have screwed up. It is time for them to make amends.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-29841084659738604372021-10-09T07:16:00.003-07:002021-10-09T07:16:34.897-07:00Male homosexualityMale homosexuality has long been regarded as being an evolutionary puzzle. Around 4 percent of men are homosexuals. They have on average five times fewer children than their heterosexual counterparts. Why doesn't the behavior die out? A common explanation is that "superwoman" genes spread through the female lineage, while inducing female behavior in males as a side effect. No doubt this explains some male homosexuality.<P>
I previously discussed the possibility of parasites causing male homosexuality in <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2017/04/ubiquitous-parasites.html">my 2017 "ubiquitous parasites" article</a>.<P> At the time I discussed culturally-induced homosexual behavior - giving the example of celibate priests and altar boys. However, the possibility of male homosexuality being induced by organic parasites is also of interest.<P>
Homosexual men spend more time having sex and less time raising children. That's a situation favoring parasite transmission. Homosexual men famously have a high parasite burden. Male homosexuality correlates with HIV/AIDS, hepatitis A, B and C, gonorrhea, syphilis, toxoplasmosis - and probably many other infectious diseases. It is widely understood that male homosexual behavior causes parasite transmission. However it also seems possible that causation could run the other way around: parasites could favor the production of homosexual behavior - for example: by interfering with development during childhood.<P>
Many parasites would "prefer" to sterilize their hosts, as a strategy to divert host resources away from producing offspring and towards spreading parasite genes. Male homosexuality is not sterilization, but it <em>drastically</em> reduces reproductive output - and so from the Point of view of parasites, it comes close. Many parasites would "like" to influence their hosts in this direction. Their influences may systematically add up.<P>
Of course, it is not politically correct to say that male homosexuality could be (a symptom of) a disease. It took a long struggle by activists to get homosexuality out of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. However, science doesn't care about what is in fashion - so the hypothesis need to be on the table and the evidence needs to be examined.<P>
I don't have a lot of new evidence to present here. Many lab experiments relating to the topic are probably unethical, so we may have to rely on an analysis of the results of "natural experiments". Epidemiology is an obvious place to look for evidence for infectious homosexuality. My understanding is that homosexuality is fairly evenly distributed in human populations. That doesn't favor the hypothesis the "infectious homosexuality" hypothesis, but it is at least consistent with it - if a widespread parasite is involved.<P>
Regardless of whether "infectious homosexuality" is a thing, science and technology are likely to be able to detect and reverse tendencies towards homosexuality in childhood. However, "infectious homosexuality" might make this outcome happen faster. Then that time comes, it seems likely to be a new controversial dilemma for those involved.<P>
<H2>References</h2>
<LI><a href="https://www.gwern.net/docs/genetics/selection/2000-cochran.pdf">INFECTIOUS CAUSATION OF DISEASE: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE</a>
<LI><a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2017/04/ubiquitous-parasites.html">Ubiquitous parasites</a>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-23642643060742752172021-10-08T21:11:00.002-07:002021-10-08T21:23:40.106-07:00Why people kissI've been reading about kissing - in particular about why people kiss. Kissing is not unique to humans, but humans and chimpanzees seem to do it more than most other animals. The consensus seems to be that kissing is mostly a mating behavior that is useful to humans. However, I am a bit sceptical about that being the end of the story.<P>
A large number of symbiotes are transmitted via kissing. Kissing transmits mononucleosis, influenza, coronaviruses, herpes, syphilis, HPV - and many other diseases. Practically eveyone has at least one of these. It is in the interests of these parasites and symbiotes to manipulate their human hosts into kissing each other. In this picture, human genes take more of a back seat, and the story of kissing hs more to do with how various parasite and symbiont visitors manipulate their human hosts into kissing each other. Just as coughing and sneezing are partly human and partly parasite caused, so it could be with kissing. Kissing would also be a case of a behavior favored by many different sets of parasite genes.<P>
The more sociable a species the more symbionts it has. There's a "spiral of sociality", where symbionts manipulate their hosts into ever closer contact, which in turn provides more opportunities for other symbionts to spread. This is an important theory in memetics - since memes act as social symbionts that induce ultrasocial behavior as part of their reproductive cycle. In other species, this "spiral of sociality" can lead to food sharing, grooming, coprophagia and many other social behaviors. Humans are quite sociable - and kissing seems to be part of the mix.<P>
How might parasites manipulate human behavior to influence kissing frequency? Since parasites are inside their hosts, they are in a good position to influence behavior. Drugs are one possibility. Another possibility is sterilizing the host. Resources spent raising children are resources that could have been spent kissing people. HPV is a famous example of human parasite-induced sterility. It blocks up the tubes of women with cancerous cells, preventing future births. Less well known, but HHV-6A is another common cause of female infertility. It infects saliviary glands, is spread via saliva and it causes infertility. The more partners a woman has, the higher her chance of infertility. Parasites are responsible for this. Men are probably harder to sterilize, but erectile dysfunction is one method. Various STDs induce this. Erection issues make it harder for a man to keep hold of any one partner, but they may make it easier for a man to kiss multiple prospective partners - and that's a situation that parasites might prefer.<P>
What evidence is there for symbiote hypothesis of kissing? Alas, I don't really know much about that yet. The hypothesis makes some predictions. It predicts that kissing frequency is likely correlated with infection with some specific parasites. It predicts that kissing behavior is more likely to be initiated by older individuals - since they will be carriers of a wider set of kissing-inducing symbionts. It predicts parasite-induced infertility - and that at least is known to be fairly common.<P>
The symbiote hypothesis of kissing is much the same as the symbiote hypothesis of sexual intercourse. As with kissing most people assume that sexual intercourse is there to benefit human genes. However a large number of diseases are spread by sexual intercourse, and a good fraction of observed sexual behavior could <em>actually</em> be there to benefit them.<P>
<h2>References<H2>
<LI><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_herpesvirus_6">HHV-6A</a>
<LI><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_papillomavirus_infection">HPV</a>
<LI><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5193130/">Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Infertility</a>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-15575724105893755632021-09-01T22:42:00.005-07:002021-09-12T21:23:30.626-07:00Cultural kin selection and political polarization<a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2014/08/cultural-kin-selection.html">Cultural kin selection</a>
often uses the same psychological mechanisms that are
involved with kin selection. For example, if you want your factory workers
to help each other more, you can put them in uniform, and then they see each
other as brothers - because of evolved kin selection mechanisms that favor
altruism between apparent kin - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homophily">homophily</a>, in a word.<P>
Cultural kin selection can act to magnify kin selection psychology - as we see
with sports teams for example, which use relatedness and unrelatedness superstimuli.<P>
It is not that hard to imagine that we get to a point where iPhone users won't
date Android users. Political polarization illustrates a similar divide. Too
many memetic differences make people treat others as though they are not part
of the same species. They unconsciously don't want to interbreed - as though
through fear of infertile offspring. This is not to say that they literally
fear this, it is implemented more as a kind of revulsion.<P>
Hamiltonian spite is generally thought to be a fairly minor
effect - harming others offering more costs than benefits.
However, cultural kin selection puts another spin on the issue
with its superstimuli and psychological manipulation.<P>
Cultural kin selection - essentially the science of shared memes -
seems like a critical tool for studying these issues to me. I've
previously called for a <a href="https://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-evolution-of-racism.html">science of racism</a>.
Perhaps a better plan would be a science of xenophobia. Much xenophobia is cultural origin -
due to lack of shared memes - rather than lack of shared genes.<P>
One interesting suggestion relating to political polarization is that it arises - in part - as a battle between
<a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2018/10/survivalism-vs-hedonism.html">hedonism and survivalism</a> -
with the "right" being survivalists and the "left" being hedonists. Framed in terms of heritable information, that
would be the right favoring DNA and the left being more on the side of memes and psychological replicators. That's
not my idea - and I don't know what to make of it. I generally view most "left" and "right" parties as
"absurd churches", and avoid getting involved. So: I'm not much of an insider and don't know what many of
the doctrines are. I do think the idea may have some truth to it, though.<P>
Update: The idea that the "right" are survivalists and the "left" are hedonists came to me from Curt Welch. The nearest thing I can find to a public discussion of the issue by him is <a href="http://curtwelch.blogspot.com/2014/02/some-thoughts-on-sam-harris-book-free.html">here</a>.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-82983465530840471232020-05-24T14:50:00.004-07:002020-05-24T20:15:44.038-07:00Synopsis of my replicator critiqueFor most traditional meme enthusiasts, memes are "the new replicators" -
or are practically defined in terms of the Dawkins replicator-vehicle framework.
I'm reasonably convinced by the critics that this is an unsuitable foundation for
a general purpose evolutionary framework.<P>
I've gone into this in a video/essay <a href="https://alife.co.uk/essays/against_replicator_terminology/">Against Replicator Terminology</a> and in my 2011 memetics book, but here's a handy synposis:<P>
Part of the problem is terminology. Dawkins (1976) defined "replicator" as follows:<P>
"A replicator is anything in the universe of which copies are made."<P>
One issue (1) is the "replicator"-"replicatee" distinction. You would think
the appropriate term would be "replicatee" - and "replicator" would be
the thing doing the copying.<P>
Another issue (2) is copying fidelity. The "replicate" term suggests high
fidelity copying. The corresponding term without that implication is
"reproduce". A <em>replica</em> is normally a type of high fidelity <em>reproduction</em>.
The Dawkins definition steamrollers over this distinction.<P>
These are terminology criticisms - but my last critique is scientific -
rather than just being about what words refer to which meanings. The
"replicator" terminology suggests a modeling framework in which
two inheritied entities are either idenitical or different. It represents a
kind of binary view of inherited information. That works quite well
for advanced systems of herediy because those have evolved to be digital.
Nucleic acid and language are both basically digital systems which
involve and use redundancy and error correction to avoid contamination
by noise. However, not all systems involving inherited information are like
this. In particular some of the systems I am interested in are those
which exhibit Darwinian family trees in a more-or-less analog media.
For example, electrical discharges, propagating cracks and fractal
drainage patterns. These exhibit copying (of position and other attribuutes)
with variation filtered by the environment, and a good number of
Darwinian models apply to these systems. However the replicator-vehicle framework
seems pretty irrelevant to their study. This consideration has the
effect of displacing replicators from the foundation of Darwinism.
They are still applicable to more advanced systems with error
detection and correction, (but see points 1 and 2). As students
of cultural evolution sometimes point out, not all cultural
inheritance involves error-corrected systems such as language.<P>
My personal preference is to just grant this point to critics of
memetics and move on. <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/05/the-m-word.html?m=0">The "m" word</a>
is still pretty useful, replicator terminology aside.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-36186529246733785682020-03-31T05:58:00.000-07:002020-03-31T11:33:49.096-07:00Sylvain Magne: a new theoretical modelI've covered the work of Sylvain Magne here before, see:<P>
<UL>
<LI><a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2015/11/sylvain-magne-information-vs-codes.html">Sylvain Magne: information vs codes</a>
<LI><a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2015/05/sylvain-magne-what-is-meme.html">Sylvain Magne: What is a meme?</a>
</UL>
Here are some updated thoughts from Sylvain about memes:<P>
<UL>
<LI><a href="http://memelogic.blogspot.com/2020/03/first-part-of-3-of-my-new-theoretical.html">Part 1 - Redefining the meme and the replicator - A new model</a>
<LI><a href="http://memelogic.blogspot.com/2020/03/part-2-of-3-of-my-new-theoretical-model.html">Part 2 - Redefining the meme and the replicator - Finding The Memes</a>
<LI><a href="http://memelogic.blogspot.com/2020/03/part-3-of-3-of-my-new-theoretical-model.html">Part 3 - Redefining the meme and the replicator - Transmemes</a>
</UL>
It is quite nice. I like what I would describe as the "information theory" perspective in these essays. However, I don't really agree with all of it. To go over some of the differences between our positions:<P>
<UL>
<LI>Sylvain likes and uses the "replicator" terminology, while I typically avoid it and think it is confusing.
<LI>Sylvain classifies varaints as identical or non-identical. IMO, that can work well for more digital systems, but isn't so useful for more analog ones.
<LI>Sylvain proposes that we divide evolving information systems into codes and readers. Readers classify and recognize codes. While readers are widespread for genes and memes I am not convinced that they are always present. It is often a useful idea - but "readers" seem non-fundamental to me.
<LI>Sylvain rejects memes inside brains. I like memes inside brains.
<LI>Sylvain proposes the term "transmemes" for memes that are routinely translated. For me that is practically all memes - so the terminology is not very useful.
</UL>
Regarding brains: IMO, we <em>ought</em> to be able to agree that evolving systems include psychological ones - as well as organic and cultural ones. There is copying with variation and selection inside individual brains. That is where many ideas have sex. That is where many ideas are copied. There are lots of books and literature about within-brain Darwinism. Treating the brain as a black box, identifying it as a "reader" and then claiming that it doesn't contain memes is only one perspective. You could also open it up and consider how it works. I have a summary of the case for within-brain Darwinism here: <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/02/keeping-darwin-in-mind.html">Keeping Darwin in mind</a>.<P>
Regarding "replicator" terminology, I once explained my position in an essay: <a href="https://alife.co.uk/essays/against_replicator_terminology/">Against Replicator Terminology</a>. The fight over the utility of the "replicator" term is now pretty well-trodden.<P>
<H2>References</H2>
<UL>
<LI>Tyler, Tim (2011) <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2011/09/claim-that-evolution-doesnt-require.html">The claim that evolution doesn't require replicators</a>
<LI>Tyler, Tim (2013) <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2013/02/keeping-darwin-in-mind.html">Keeping Darwin in mind</a>
</UL>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-39121045325250424762020-03-28T10:47:00.000-07:002020-03-28T10:47:13.408-07:00Jason da Silva: When fear goes viral<iframe width="800" height="450" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/0mqXrNDMeCg" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe><P>
Jason offers a Coronavirus spiel with a heavy side helping of memetics.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-25745937663455709172019-12-11T14:42:00.002-08:002020-03-28T10:44:09.929-07:00Developmental knobsDevelopment features a number of what are fairly widely called "developmental knobs". A "developmental knob" represents a scalar variable whiich affects development and which can be influenced, or "turned" by genes, the environment, or some combination of these factors. The knobs are implemented using a variety of means - including changing chemical concentrations, developmental delays or altered behaviour patterns. A few examples:<P>
<UL>
<LI><STRONG>Reproduction/maintenance axis</STRONG> - controlled by the dietary energy restriction;
<LI><STRONG>Muscle investment axis</STRONG> - controlled by exercise;
<LI><STRONG>Hunger axis</STRONG> - controlled by hormones - e.g. grehlin;
<LI><STRONG>Love axis</STRONG> - controlled by hormones - e.g. oxytocin;
<LI><STRONG>r/K axis</STRONG> - controlled by resource availability;
</UL>
Not <em>all</em> of these knobs are solely under genetic control. Many can be influenced by symbiotic visitors. Some gut microbes are known to promote ghrelin synthesis - and probably that helps stimulate their hosts to eat more food which in turn feeds the microbes. Plants attempt to manipulate the developmental systems of the animals that feed on them. An example is phytoestrogens - which are typically hormone-like compounds in pllants that bind to estrogen receptors in animals, blocking uptake of real estrogen and so sabotaging the sexual development of the animals involved.<P>
Some memes are likely have access to some of these developmental knobs. They probably use them to divert host resources away from host reproduction - and into meme reproduction. Sterlizing their hosts is a common interest of many memes. That memes sterilize their hosts is very well documented. Getting a college degree appears to severely hamper reproductive output for many women. See <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2018/06/the-sterilization-of-females.html">The sterilization of females</a> for more.<P>
The r/K axis is a well-known developmental axis. One end of it favors rapid reporduction and the other favors lots of parental investment in each offspring. If memes could get hold of it, they could reduce host reproductive output, likely to their own benefit.<P>
Another example is the "love" axis. Christian memes encourage their owners to love Jesus. That Jesus is a long-dead creature of myth and legend is apparently not a big deterrent. As far as I can tell, some Christians are genuinely in love with Jesus. That the associated memes benefit from creating this love seems likely.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-80137705052987822912019-10-13T20:41:00.000-07:002019-10-16T21:12:18.900-07:00Panmemetics?An <a href="https://www.academia.edu/36338141/Invasion_of_the_Mind_Snatchers._On_memes_and_cultural_parasites">article</a> by Maarten Boudry proposes that the term "panmemetics" be used for the memetics visualized by Susan Blackmore - which is contrasted with Daniel Dennett's presentation in his recent book on cultural evolution. Over to the author:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>in Dennett’s current account, in particular his use of Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) Darwinian spaces to make sense of the “de-Darwinizing” of culture and the conscious domestication of memes, moves away from panmemetics, perhaps more clearly than his earlier Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. Even though memes initially evolved by blind and unguided evolution, claims Dennett in his new book, many were gradually domesticated by their hosts, who became more reflective and self-conscious about them. As culture gradually moves in the direction of the “intelligent design” corner of the Darwinian space (top-down, foresighted, directed), the meme’s eye view loses traction and becomes less interesting. Let me try to spell out the differences between the two approaches, as I see them. First, unlike Dennett’s account in BBB, panmemetics leaves little or no room for human autonomy and creativity. Panmemetics suggests that we are not in control of our thoughts; if anything, the reverse is true. In the words of Robert Aunger: “Do we have thoughts, or do they have us?” (Aunger, 2002, loc. 120) A second and related problem with panmemetics is that it threatens to level all distinctions between harmful and useful cultural inventions. If the whole of human culture is seen as just a set of swarms of viruses bent on exploiting our brains as a breeding ground for their own reproduction, we no longer have any theoretical resources to distinguish between good and bad memes, between beautiful folk songs and annoying earworms, between science and superstition.</BLOCKQUOTE>
The distinction might be an interesting one, but I don't think I can stomach rechristening memetics, "panmemetics". I am not a big proponent of the "de-Darwinizing” of culture that Dennett proposes. My conception of Darwinism is big enough to include all cultural evolution. We can have a picture involving degrees of intelligent design without dragging the rather vague and subjective "Darwin"-based terminology into it. IMO, panmemetics is just memetics. Dennett's idea that the "Darwinism" fades out as the intelligent design fades in doesn't seem interesting enough to warrant a big terminological shift. We can just use the "Darwinian" term for the more general framework that includes ID.<P>
Regarding the criticisms of panmemetics: I don't see much impact of memetics on the issue of human autonomy and creativity (as mentioned in the quote). It is true that memetics suggests that we are not in control of our thoughts - but surely that is hardly news to most psychologists. I don't agree that memetics "threatens to level all distinctions between harmful and useful cultural inventions". The most obvious distinction between "good" and "bad" memes is between meme interests and the interests of DNA genes of the nuclear DNA of the host. The host is likely to have more than one gene, and there could be more than one host, but these issues can be deal with by averaging - as in the "parliament of genes" concept.<P>
The author raises the issue of personal host interests - and where they fit into the picture. My favored approach to this is to have three spheres involving Darwinian dynamics:<P>
<UL><LI>DNA gene evolution;
<LI>Meme evolution;
<LI>Psychological evolution;
</UL>
The last one is the least well understood - but information is copied with variation and selection in the brain, and we can use Darwinian models to represent the resulting dynamics.
Psychological evolution is more obviously multi-level - since copying takes place at the level of branching axon impulses as well as at the level of ideas, and probably at multiple other levels in between. Personal interests can then be discussed in terms of copied information patterns - using the same modeling framework as with memes and genes.<P>
Maarten Boudry goes into some more details about what is wrong with "panmemetics" in another paper titled "<a href="https://www.academia.edu/32979195/Attack_of_the_Memes.docx">Attack of the Memes</a>". Overall, I'm not seeing it.<P>
Another exhiibit from the latter paper:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Memes that are parasitic from the perspective of my genes may simply be the outcome of deliberate human choices. Talk of "selfish memes" and "rogue culture" can be misleading here, as if humans are the hapless victims of the ideas of modernity. These are not novel memetic purposes but distinctively human ones.</BLOCKQUOTE>
Well, maybe, but maybe not. Selfish memes / rogue memes are a possible and valid answer too. It depends on the circumstances. One must also ask where those humans got their preferences. Some come from genes, some come from memes and some come from psychological forces (e.g. alcohol addiction). Memes are on the list. They can influence host preferences via manipulation from within hosts minds. Because a human has some preference, that doesn't mean it didn't ultimately come from memes.<P>
References:<P>
<UL>
<LI><a href="https://www.academia.edu/36338141/Invasion_of_the_Mind_Snatchers._On_memes_and_cultural_parasites">Invasion of the Mind Snatchers. On memes and cultural parasites</a> by Maarten Boudry
<LI><a href="https://www.academia.edu/32979195/Attack_of_the_Memes.docx">Attack of the Memes</a> by Maarten Boudry
</UL>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-85141734985675756062019-10-09T20:35:00.001-07:002019-10-10T21:07:05.362-07:00The Organism-Centered Approach to Cultural EvolutionI found a paper from 2015 that offers a reply to the criticism of mine, that cultural evolution in academia is "host centric". I summarize that criticism in my article "<a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2014/01/the-host-centric-approach-to-cultural.html">The host-centric approach to cultural evolution</a>".<P>
Ben Cullen also summarizes this criticism in his "Contagious Ideas" book. To quote from <a href="http://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2012/11/tim-tyler-cullen-contagious-ideas-review.html">my review</a>:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>The third and fourth chapters mostly look at what Ben calls "American Cultural Selectionism". This is characterised by explaining culture in terms of human traits, and tracing their passage between humans in terms of "oblique" and "horizontal" transmission of those traits. Ben classified these models as being "inclusive phenotype" models - since they include traits encoded by genes and memes in the phenotypes of human individuals. Rather than featuring distinct cultural individuals, phenotypes and populations - like memetics does - the "inclusive phenotype" models combine cultural and genetic influences within one human phenotype - in what Ben patronisingly refers to as a "bio-cultural muddle".</BLOCKQUOTE><P>
<a href="https://www.academia.edu/16265349/The_Organism-Centered_Approach_to_Cultural_Evolution">Here</a> is a paper that offers a reply. It classifies approaches to cultural evolution as "organism centric" and "meme centric" - and argues for the superiority of the former. Overall, it is as though Dawkins had never written The Selfish Gene - explaining why Hamilton, Trivers and others had shifted focus away from organisms and towards genes.<P>
The article says:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>Instead of offering a set of criteria, we will pose several questions that need to be answered in order for there to be a coherent MC. First, can there be multiple copies of a meme within an individual’s head? If so, how are neuronal states individuated into distinct memes?</BLOCKQUOTE>
The claim that these questions need to be answered for memetics to be coherent is a mistake. It is quite possible to treat the entire human brain as a black box and conly consider how memes are transmitted into and out of it, via, talking, listening, etc. Memetics doesn't depend in any way on implementation details of neuroscientific representation. It would be nice to know all the details of what went on inside brains, but it is perfectly possible to discuss meme frequencies without this. That is, by and large, what memetics has done, because all the neuroscientific details are not there yet.<P>
Another question it is claimed that meme theorists need to answer is:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>And for the spork example above, is this a case of fork and spoon memes reproducing and finding themselves within the same utensil, instead of each occupying distinct utensils? Or is a spork a unique meme related to spoon and fork memes, but not an instance of either? These are just some of the sorts of questions that a MC needs to answer"</BLOCKQUOTE>
Those are alternative modelling scenarios within memetics. Researchers might choose between them depending on their research goals. However, memetics itself doesn't need to choose between them! It is the same situation as with genetics - the same section of DNA can be modelled as consisting of two or three genes, depending on what traits the researcher is interesting in studying. Genes can overlap, and that is just a fact of life, not a foundational challenge to genetics.<P>
I've criticized host-centric cultural evolution as ignoring the dynamics of meme replication in machines, thereby missing the very possibility of a <a href="https://alife.co.uk/essays/memetic_takeover/">memetic takeover</a>. Here is this paper's take on that. It claims that is <em>actually</em> an advantage to the organism-centric approach - because it makes things more palatable to social scientists:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>If cultural evolutionists would embrace the MC andfocus on the number of memes (e.g. the number of pro-duced sporks), irrespective of whether these memes are actually adopted by humans, then this would decrease therelevance of cultural evolution for the social sciences andthe humanities. After all, these disciplines are mainly—if not solely—interested in culture in as much as culture affects the behavior and thinking of human beings</BLOCKQUOTE><P>
Cultural evolution within academia was developed by social scientists - and they went out of their way to make it more palatable to other social scientists, for example by stripping off biological references wherever possible, and exagerating the differences between cultural and traditional evolutionary theory. However, that is only a virtue if acceptance by existing social scientists is recognized as a valid aim. Existing social science failed to get to grips with evolutionary theory for 150 years. They typically think that "Social Darwinism" is a failed research program, and one which they do not wish to associate themselves with. It's not that pre-evolutionary social science is useless, it is that it lacked the firm foundation that evolutionary theory is now providing. Pandering to social scientists seems like a secondary goal to me. I favor going directly for correct and useful theories. If they seem revolutionary and foreign to the old guard, so be it.<P>
The paper at least recognizes the issue of there being two rival approaches here. However, it offers a series of mischaracterisations of memetics and gives the wrong answer to the issue. It would be better to just say that organism-centric cultural evolution is holistic and meme-centric cultural evolution is reductionistic. For me, even that is too flattering. Part of the problem is the theory is not just organism-centric it is host-centric - and the only hosts considered are humans. Machine intelligence as a host of memes mostly isn't on the radar, and the possibility that "the Bible" might act like a cultural organism with its own largely independent genotype and phenotype is also largely neglected.<P>
References<P>
<a href="https://www.academia.edu/16265349/The_Organism-Centered_Approach_to_Cultural_Evolution">The Organism-Centered Approach to Cultural Evolution</a> by Grant Ramsey<p>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-70097671085874153072019-09-18T21:05:00.002-07:002019-09-18T21:14:19.165-07:00Geoffrey Miller on who benefits<img src="https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/71qfvlDXe9L._US230_.jpg" align=right>Another passage from <a href="http://www.unm.edu/~gfmiller/new_papers2/miller%202000%20meme.doc">Geoffrey Miller's meme critique</a> (see also the <a href="https://on-memetics.blogspot.com/2019/09/geoffrey-miller-on-memes.html">previous post</a>) reads:<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>genes and memes are not the only alternatives as beneficiaries – there are institutions that can be treated as self-interested agents for purposes of economic, political, sociological, and cultural analysis</BLOCKQUOTE>
That seems like a mixture of levels of explanation. "Institutions" are a mix of genes, memes, gene products, meme products - and maybe some joint meme-gene products. The "products" are phenotypes. In biology, genotypes are what is inherited and phenotypes are everything that is derived from them. From this perspective, only the genes and memes form important lineages and can qualify as beneficiaries. The "products" are more transitory - they are not inherited from they affect gene and meme frequencies via selection, but don't "benefit" because they die without leaving any offspring - and "benefit" in evolutionary theory is measured in terms of fitness. Only genes, memes and other forms of inherited information really qualify.<P>
Of course you can also talk coherently about larger-scale entities benefitting in evolution. An animal might be said to benefit by having offspring. However it is just a different level of explanation. It is quite compatible with the meme's / gene's eye view. It's a lot like saying that their genes benefitted - on average. A focus on low level beneficiaries doesn't somehow exclude higher levels. I think this critique of Miller's doesn't really go anywhere. Meme enthusiasts aren't somehow ignoring institutions. Institutions are composed of memes, genes and their products. You don't need to do fitness accounting on memes, genes <em>and</em> institutions. That would be counting things twice.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-83170792596946636122019-09-18T20:28:00.001-07:002021-02-04T05:25:58.657-08:00Geoffrey Miller on memes<img src="https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/71qfvlDXe9L._US230_.jpg" align=right>Geoffrey Miller comes across as yet another evolutionary psychologist who is clueless about memes and cultural evolution. However, I recently found and read Geoffrey Miller's <a href="http://www.unm.edu/~gfmiller/new_papers2/miller%202000%20meme.doc">review of "The Meme Machine"</a>. It has its moments. However, here I'd like to quote a section from it and then explain the problem with it.<P>
<BLOCKQUOTE>To make a strong case for memes evolving contrary to our genetic interests, Blackmore would have to show that most of our memes lower our sexual attractiveness. This seems unlikely to be the case, given that the classic examples of memes – songs, fashions, moral ideals, religious convictions – are adopted and advertised by young adults precisely for their sexual appeal. Also, the fact that young males invent and propagate many more memes than other demographic groups suggests that meme-spreading remains genetically adaptive: males try to attract multiple sexual partners through various artistic, musical, and ideological displays, while most females still invest much less in this sort of courtship effort.</BLOCKQUOTE>
This is, I think a straw man attack. The evidence that memes have historically been adaptive on average from the POV of human genes is pretty strong. Humans have genetic adaptations for language - such as a "babbling" stage of development which other great apes lack. We have also been spectacularly successful in a wide range of ecosystems. I can't think of any meme enthusiast that denies this.<P>
The basic idea in memetics is <em>not</em> that memes are maladaptive <em>on average</em>, but that <em>some</em> memes are <em>sometimes</em> maladaptive. Copying machinery might print out helpful manuals, but it also prints out fake news and other deleterious nonsense. Yes, we have cars and bridges, but we also have the obesity epidemic, the smoking epidemic, the heroin epidemic, etc. It is not: "all memes are bad for your genes" or even "memes are bad for your genes on average" - instead, it is "some memes are bad for your genes".<P>
Having argued that meme and gene interests have been somewhat aligned historically, this does not <em>necessarily</em> mean that that situation will continue indefinitely. If population density increases, and horizontal meme transfer becomes the dominant force, memes could switch their strategy to one more like the ebola virus - i.e. treat the host as an expendable bag of resources and burn through it as quickly as possible. If humans are not the only hosts of memes - and many memes are also propagated by intelligent machines - such dynamics could drive the human population down dramatically. No law of nature demands that meme interests will remain somewhat aligned with the interests of all of their hosts. There are examples in nature of pathogens that wipe out one of their host species. It happens more when there are multiple host species. Then each individual species becomes expenddable. Clearly, we should bear this possibility in mind. However, you really need to have a basic understanding of cultural evolution to even be aware that this sort of possibility exists.<P>
Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4367190233877799632.post-71698193404379104202019-07-06T20:02:00.000-07:002019-07-06T20:02:08.184-07:00Stephen Shennan: Darwinian Archaeology, Culture, And The Origins of Agriculture<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/xNv_JrdpRkA" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>Tim Tylerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06623536372084468307noreply@blogger.com0