Showing posts with label sheehan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sheehan. Show all posts

Wednesday, 23 January 2013

Tim Tyler: Sheehan, The Mocking Memes (review)

Transcript:

Hi. I'm Tim Tyler, and this is a review of this book:

The Mocking Memes:A Basis for Automated Intelligence by Evan Louis Sheehan

This is a great book. In fact I think the author's views of the topic of memetics are more similar to my own views that practically any other author I can think of. Like me, the author cites the work of A.G. Cairns-Smith on genetic takeovers, and discusses the possibility of a memetic takeover. Also like me, the author is interested in the link between memetics and machine intelligence.

The author doesn't seem particularly interested in orthodox views. He starts out by radically redefining the term "meme" to be the inherited unit in universal Darwinism. That's a radical break with tradition, and I can't say I entirely approve - though certainly the inherited unit in universal Darwinism is badly in need of a name. He also radically redefines the term "information" - to means something other than what the term means in Shannon's information theory. This seems to be getting more into crank territory, and I don't think the author pulls this one off. Like me, the author regards evolution as purposeful. Like me, the author sees deep links to moral behaviour in evolutionary theory. Both views are contrary to mainstream orthodoxy.

I love this book, and don't want to spend too much time criticizing it. However, if I have to say some bad things: the book doesn't refer to the scientific literature enough for my tastes. The literature on universal Darwinism is fairly patchy, but there's more to it that this book might suggest. I also felt that the universal Darwinism was of a rather mild kind, that only covered the biological realm. An extreme form of universal Darwinism that extends to propagating cracks, turbulence, flames and crystals seems quite defensible, but such ideas don't get coverage in this book.

Probably my favourite part of the book was where an argument for Lamarckism in the organic realm was presented.

Lamarckism - in the form of the inheritance of acquired characteristics - is an idea which is widely disparaged in modern times. One of the common arguments given against cultural evolution being Darwinian is that it works partly on Lamarckian principles, while organic evolution is solely Darwinian. A common response is that cultural evolution is not Lamarckian either - however here I will take a different position.

Lamarck apparently thought that all acquired traits could potentially be inherited. However the fact that some acquired characteristics are inherited in the organic realm is pretty obvious - such as when a dog acquires fleas and then its offspring inherit them. Indeed, with 8% of human DNA inherited from viruses, it seems difficult to argue that no acquired traits are inherited. At this point, there are various replies by those who still want to claim that organic inheritance is wholly non-Lamarckian - I won't go into those here. This book provides another type of case where we see the inheritance of acquired characteristics in the organic realm - one that doesn't involve symbiosis. The author argues that surgical breast enhancements are inherited, and tend to produce offspring with larger breasts. A mechanism is provided: those with breast enhancements tend to attract mates who prefer larger breasts, and some of that preference will have a genetic basis. Genes in men for a preference for larger breasts will tend to be statistically linked to genes whose expression produces bigger breasts when in women, due to their shared evolutionary history. So: we can expect breast enhancement patients to have offspring with larger breasts than would have been produced if no enhancement surgery had taken place. The reasoning here can be applied to most sexually-selected traits. It also works with traits that can be amplified naturally - using Lamarck's principle of use and disuse - such as large, bulging muscles.

The centerpiece of the book is a large section about the memory-prediction framework and bi-directional hierarchies in the brain. This material was inspired by Jeff Hawkins' book On Intelligence. While interesting, this was the most long-winded and difficult section of the book. While I am sympathetic to the idea of the brain as a prediction engine, I think machine intelligence will feature a considerable quantity of bottom-up engineering, with neuroscience and biomimicry playing a relatively minor role. The author seems to envisage a much more neuroscience-inspired approach than I do. An aeroplane and a bird both make use of lift. Similarly, a computer and a brain will both be masters of inductive inference. However, they differ considerably in the details of their operation. The brain is hampered considerably by design constraints - like being made mostly out of cells - and having to squeeze through the female human pelvis. We should be able to do much better.

The book finishes by discussing the evolving universes of Smolin and Gardner, and proposing an alternative hypothesis - involving worlds simulating worlds which in turn are simulating worlds. Though labelled as speculation, such a scenario seems relatively unlikely to me.

Anyway, this is a great book. As well as hard copy, it's also available as a free download on the author's web site.

Enjoy.

Wednesday, 30 November 2011

Memes as software

In The Laughing Genes - A Scientific Perspective on Ethics and Morality Evan Louis Sheehan has a great analogy for meme-gene coevolution. He says:
This is analogous to the way in which the hardware and the software of computer systems have co-evolved, always remaining compatible with each other, yet each taking advantage of the other’s growing capabilities.
Memetic creatures are like software - and genetic creatures are like hardware. The memes-as-software theme is also prominent in:Dennett talks about running the English Virtual Machine on your "necktop" - by analogy with running the Java Virtual Machine on your laptop - which is neat.

I think that the memes-as-software perspective is a fertile metaphor that illuminates - and is illuminated by - issues such as the relative significance of memes and genes, the role of memes in adapting to unfamiliar environments, the relative rates of memetic and genetic evolution.

The idea of memes-as-software has also been represented in the movies - in particular in The Matrix:

Wednesday, 9 November 2011

Rivals to gene-based terminology

In my memetics book, I propose that we use the term "gene" for the heritable elements in evolution - and ignore or discard the numerous dictionaries and textbooks that claim that genes are "molecular units of heredity" - or that they have anything to do with DNA or RNA.

There have been some other proposals for terms that convey this meaning:
  • Mneme. Richard Semon (1904) wrote:

    Instead of speaking of a factor of memory, a factor of habit, or a factor of heredity and attempting to identify one with another, I have preferred to consider these as manifestations of a common principal, which I shall call the mnemic principal.
  • Meme. In his book The Mocking Memes - A Basis for Automated Intelligence, Evan Louis Sheehan writes:
    I define memes to include every sort of pattern that serves as a template for its own replication.
  • Replicator. David Hull (1988b) proposed replicators fill the role of the carriers of heredity in evolving systems.
Deploying Richard Semon's term "mneme" in the modern era seems rather impractical.

Evan Louis Sheehan's "meme" tries to hijack an existing term. "Meme" has an established meaning which does not obviously need to change. I think the attempt fails.

The proposals of David Hull and Evan Louis Sheehan also suffer from a technical problem - since they only include copyable heredity information, and not all heritable information is capable of being copied.

How do genes differ from ordinary information? In other words, what is an example of information that is not inherited? Conventionally, there is no inheritance without some living thing being involved. Also, information that is destroyed is not inherited. Other forms of information could potentially be inherited by some living thing or another.

So: "gene" still seems to be better overall. Of course, this raises the issuse of what name should we give to small chunks of nucleic acid. Im my book, I wrote:

Those are "genes" too, of course, and can normally simply be referred to as such - but if a term is really wanted to refer specifically to nucleic acid chunks while excluding other forms of inheritance - they could be called "organic genes", "cellular genes", "nuclear genes" or "DNA genes" - depending on exactly what you actually meant.
What about snappy abbreviations?

"Denes" is my pick for "DNA genes" - with "denetics" referring to their study.

"Nenes" is my pick for "nuclear genes" - with "nenetics" referring to their study.

Update 2013-05-19: Dawkins said:

Completely unknown to me when I coined "meme" in 1976, the German biologist Richard Semon wrote a book called Die Mneme (English translation The Mneme (London, Allen & Unwln, 1921)) in which he adopted the "mneme" coined in 1870 by the Austrian physiologist Ewald Hering.

Thursday, 2 June 2011

Against the extended genotype

One way of modelling human culture is as an extension of human biology. If you do that then one way of modelling cultural information is as part of a human extended genotype. The products of culture would then be modelled as being part of the phenotype of that extended genotype. This type of model is, alas, common in academic studies of cultural evolution. As Mesoudi (2011) puts it:
In a typical cultural evolution model, a population is assumed to be composed of a set of individuals, each of whom posseses a particular set of cultural traits. A set of microevolutionary processes is specified that changes the variation of those traits over time.
An "extended genotype" would make reasonable sense as a model if culture was only transmitted vertically. However, in fact only a few traits are only transmitted vertically. If you introduce "oblique" and "horizontal" transmission the result is more like multiple genotypes than a single genotype - and the "microevolutionary processes" involved can get complicated.

Using this type of model, you can approximately reproduce the same dynamics that are actually exhibited by cultural evolution - if you are prepared to model sufficiently complex micro-evolutionary transmission processes. However, this type of model is philosophically unsatisfactory. As with symbiotic gut bacteria and foodstuffs, it is best to just classify cultural entities as belonging to different species. They have their own lifecycles and inheritance mechanisms and interests. They usually spend some of their lifecycle outside the human body, where they may be destroyed or copied. Modelling them as extensions of the human genotype runs contrary to Occam's razor and makes no sense at all. It leads to byzantine models, which are specific to cultural evolution processes. The correct approach is to use the existing perfectly conventional models of symbiosis. That is the approach taken by memetics.

The extended genotype is sometimes codified in the form of the phenogenotype - as in this 1992 paper.

Alas, "phenogenotype" is very messy terminology, which is best forgotten about. As Herbert Gintis once said:

Durham uses the term 'meme' for a unit of cultural inheritance. I think his defense of this is one of the strongest points in this great book. He shows that culture cannot be identified with phenotype or behavior. It follows that we must drop the term 'geno-phenotype'. In its place we can use the term 'geno-memotype.'
Phenogenotypes were an awful messed-up concept - but in memetics, there is no 'geno-memotype' to replace it. That is pretty-much an unnecessary concept. Instead there is symbiosis.

Evan Louis Sheehan has a nice way of explaining the problem with "extended genotype" models in his book: The Laughing Genes. He says:

Perhaps the ideas that aided in early human survival should be considered as some sorts of extensions to the genes. Then, just as good genes yielded good biological attributes such as strong muscles, good ideas yielded good extensions to biology in the form of such things as clubs and spears. Indeed, this is the way I used to think of cultural ideas, as extensions to the genes that underwent evolutionary development in parallel to the genes. Ideas that provided survival advantage were passed down vertically from generation to generation, and persisted simply because they provided survival advantage, just as some genetically inspired valuable traits, such as keen eyesight or strong muscles might do. I now see this as an incomplete picture of the ways that ideas are able to evolve. I must thank Dawkins once again for the revelation that allowed me to see this.

The most comprehensive treatment of this academic folly is probably Ben Cullen's book: Contagious Ideas: On Evolution, Culture, Archaeology and Cultural Virus Theory. He calls the idea by the term "inclusive phenotype" - since the academic researchers involved bundle cultural and genetic influences into one human phenotype - in what Ben refers to as a "bio-cultural muddle".

References